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1

THE CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982, SECTIONS 25 AND 35*
by

Kent McNeil**
The Constitution Act, 1982, proclaimed in force as of April 17,
1982, supplements the other Acts and Orders which already made up
the Constitution of Canada.
It does not detract from any of the
rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada guaranteed by earlier
constitutional
instruments.
Section
91(24)
of
the
1867
Constitution
Act,
the
Rupert's
Land
Order,
and
the
Natural
Resources Transfer Agreements, which have been discussed earlier
this week, all continue to apply.
In fact, they are specifically
included in the new Act's definition of the Constitution of
Canada.
However, the 1982 Constitution Act goes further than previous
constitutional instruments by providing additional guarantees for
the rights of aboriginal peoples.

Section 25
As everyone knows, the 1982 Act gave Canada a Charter of Rights
and Freedoms.
Section 15 of the Charter, which came into force on
April 17, 1985, provides that everyone is equal before and under
the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of
the law without discrimination, particularly discrimination based
on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or
mental or physical disability.
It might be said that the special
status and rights which Canada's aboriginal peoples have are
inconsistent with this equality provision.
To avoid this result, a saving provision was included within
Charter itself.
This is section 25, which provides:

the

25. The guarantee in this Charter of certain
rights and freedoms shall not be construed so
as
to
abrogate
or
derogate
from
any

*
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The Constitution Act, 1982, Sections 25 and 35
aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms
that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of
Canada including
(a) any rights or freedoms that have been
recognized
by
the
Royal
Proclamation
of
October 7, 1763; and
(b) any rights or freedoms that now exist by
way of land claims agreements or may be so
acquired.
The
language
of
this
section
is
very
broad.
It
refers
specifically to treaty and aboriginal rights, but also mentions
other rights and freedoms, including those recognized by the Royal
Proclamation of 1763, and any rights or freedoms that now exist or
may be acquired by land claims agreements.
A question I have asked myself is whether section 25 protects
rights which status Indians have under the Indian Act from Charter
challenges.
I think it does.
These are rights which no other
Canadians
have,
and
which
may
offend
the
equality
rights
provision.
Parliament nonetheless has the authority under section
91(24) of the 1867 Constitution Act to make laws for Indians and
lands reserved for the Indians.
The Indian Act was passed to
fulfil this legislative mandate.
So even without section 25, the
Indian Act, or at least any provisions in it which have a
legitimate federal purpose, may have continued to be valid, even
though discriminating on the basis of race.
But the inclusion of
section 25 in the Charter fortifies this conclusion, and in my
view
protects
the
Indian
Act
generally
from
the
Charter.
Provisions of the Indian Act which discriminate on the basis of
sex, however, should have been invalidated by section 28 of the
Charter, which provides that, notwithstanding anything in the
Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed
equally to male and female persons.
This would seem to apply to
section 25, placing a restriction on the rights and freedoms of
aboriginal peoples referred to there.
So as far as the Indian Act
is concerned, the provisions of that Act which discriminated on
the basis of sex may have been void as of April 17, 1982, three
years before the Act was amended to remove those discriminatory
provisions.
So what is the effect of section 25?
It seems fairly certain that
section 25 is merely a saving provision--it is not in itself a
source of rights.
On this, the case law decided since the Charter
came into force has been quite consistent.
In Steinhauer v. R., [1985] 3 C.N.L.R. 187, Madame Justice Veit of
the Alberta Courtof Queen's Bench said (at p.191) that section 25
"is a shield and does not add to aboriginal rights".
She
accordingly held that section 25 provided no protection against
[1988]
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the federal Fisheries Act
exercising his treaty right

to a status
to fish.

Indian

who

was

allegedly

In Augustine and Augustine v. ~; Barlow v. !.!_, [1987] 1 C.N.L.R.
20 (N.B.C.A.), Stratton, Chief Justice of New Brunswick, agreed
(at p.44) with Peter Hogg when he wrote in the second edition of
his text, Constitutional Law of Canada, that s.25 "does not create
any new rights, or even fortify existing rights.
It is simply a
saving provision, included to make clear that the Charter is not
to be construed as derogating from 'any aboriginal, treaty or
other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of
Canada'."
The Chief Justice held that section 25 provided no
protection against the provincial Fish and Wildlife Act to Micmac
Indians who were hunting at ~ight.

Section 35
I would now like to move on to section 35 of the 1982 Constitution
Act, which is the more important provision relating to aboriginal
peoples' rights.
It reads like this:
35.(1)
The
existing
aboriginal
and
treaty
rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are
hereby recognized and affirmed.
( 2) In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of
Canada" includes the Indian, Inuit and Metis
peoples of Canada.
(3) For greater certainty, in subsection
(1) "treaty rights" includes rights that now
exist by way of land claims agreements or may
be so acquired.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act, the aboriginal and treaty rights
referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed
equally to male and female persons.
As originally enacted, section 35 contained only subsections (1)
and (2).
The provision specifying that "treaty rights" include
rights acquired by existing and future land claims agreements was
added
in
1984
after
being
agreed
to
at
the
March
1983
constitutional conference.
This is an important provision, for it
gives constitutional protection to the James Bay Agreement (see
Eastmain Band v. Gilpin, [1987] 3 C.N.L.R. 54 (Que.Prov.Ct.)), and
ensures
that
aboriginal
peoples
will
not
be
giving
up
constitutionally protected rights for unprotected rights in any
future land claims settlements.
The provision that aboriginal and
treaty rights are guaranteed equally to male and female persons
was also added in 1984, as a result of the 1983 accord.

[1988]
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The first thing to note is that, unlike section 25, section 35 is
not in the Charter.
It forms a separate part of the 1982 Act
(i.e. Part II), which comes immediately after the Charter.
This
gives section 35 some advantages.
For example, it means that it
is not limited by section 1 of the Charter, which says that the
rights and freedoms set out in the Charter are "subject only to
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society."
(Note that section
25 has been held to be subject to this restriction: see R. v.
Nicholas and Bear, [1985] 4 C.N.L.R. 153, where New Brunswick
Provincial Court Judge Desjardins said (at pp.162-63) that the
Fisheries Act and regulations thereunder are for the purpose of
conservation and management of the fisheries, and as such are
reasonable restrictions on aboriginal rights to fish.
He also
held that section 35 of the 1982 Constitution Act did not protect
these rights, because they were not in existence when that Act
came into force.
We will return to this issue in a moment.)
Moreover, because section 35 is not in the Charter, it is not
subject to section 33 which permits Parliament and the provincial
legislatures to override certain of the Charter's provisions.

"abo~ 1ginal

The words
peoples of Canada" are defined in section
35(2) as including "the Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples of
Canada."
But no further definition of those terms is provided.
The term "Indian" cannot mean the same thing as in section 91(24)
of the 1867 Constitution Act because the Supreme Court of Canada
has held that the term "Indians" in section 91(24) includes Inuit
(see Re Eskimos, [1939] 2 D.L.R. 417), and convincing arguments
have be--e;-m~~hat Metis are also included in section 91(24) (see
Clem Chartier, "'Indian': An Analysis of the Term as Used in
Section 91(24) of the British North America Act, 1867" (1978-79),
43 Sask.L.Rev. 37).
Yet in section 35 of the 1982 Act these three
groups are differentiated.
So "Indian" must have a narrower
meaning than in section 91(24).
One approach to this issue would be to apply the Indian Act
definition of "Indian" to section 35.
The result would be that
the term "Indian" in section 35 would refer to status Indians.
However, this would seem to be inappropriate because it would give
Parliament the legislative authority to define a term in the
Constitution.
Moreover, in 1985 Parliament amended the Indian Act
so as to expand the class of status Indians to include some
persons who had lost status or who never had status.
So the
definition of the class known as status Indians has changed since
1982.
If the Indian Act definition of "Indian" is adopted for the
purposes of section 35 of the 1982 Act, this means that Parliament
has
already
unilaterally
amended
the
Constitution.
Clearly
Parliament has no power to do this.

[1988]
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Another approach to the definition of "Indian" in section 35, and
to the definition of "Inuit" as well, would be to apply a test
based
on
such
things
as
racial
blood
content,
cultural
affiliation,
group
acceptance,
self-identification
or
a
combination of these factors.
But section 35 provides no guidance
as to the appropriateness of using any of these various factors to
develop workable definitions.
The problem of defining the term "Metis" is even more complex.
Are the Metis all persons of mixed blood, or only those persons of
mixed blood who did not associate themselves with Indian tribes or
bands?
If one adopts a mixed blood approach, what percentage of
Indian (or Inuit) blood is necessary to make a person Metis?
(Apparently Louis Riel had only one-eighth Indian blood.)
Or
should the Metis be limited as a group to the descendants of those
persons who made up the "Metis Nation" in the Red River region,
and who later gathered around Batoche, in the nineteenth century?
These questions have yet to be resolved.
Perhaps the best
solution would be a constitutional amendment giving the aboriginal
peoples themselves the power to determine who belongs to their
respective groups, as part of broader powers of self-government.
However, to do so one s t i l l has to decide to whom this power
should be given, which itself involves making some determination
of who the Indians, Inuit and Metis are.
Perhaps this is not as
big a problem as it may seem to be, for the core of each of those
groups is probably fairly easily identified, and so persons who
are within the core could initially be given the power to
determine how broad the definition of the group should be.
Turning to subsection (1) of section 35, it recognizes and affirms
the "existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal
peoples of Canada".
"Treaty rights" must include rights preserved
or acquired by treaties entered into between Indian tribes or
nations and the Crown, both before and since Confederation.
Examples
are
treaty
land
entitlements
(~
rights
to
have
reserves set aside), annuity rights, and hunting and fishing
rights.
As we have seen, any rights acquired before or after
April 17, 1982, by land claims agreements, i.e. by settlement of
comprehensive
claims
based
on
aboriginal
title,
are
also
explicitly included by subsection (3).
Possibly any rights which
the
aboriginal
peoples
may
have
by
virtue
of
international
treaties are covered as well.
An ex~mple may be the Jay Treaty of
1794, entered into by Britain and the United States, which
provided that Indians living on either side of the international
boundary between Canada and the United States were to be free to
pass across the boundary, and to trade freely with one another and
carry their own goods across the boundary duty free.

[1988]
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The aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by section 35 would
be any rights which the aboriginal peoples have as the first
inhabitants of Canada.
These would include land rights based on
aboriginal title, hunting and fishing rights, and the right to
retain at least some of their customary laws (particularly in the
area of family law: see Re Tagornak Adoption Petition, [1984] 1
C.N.L.R.
185,
where
Mr.
Justice
Marshall
of
the
Northwest
Territories Supreme Court held that he was bound by section 35 to
recognize a customary Inuit adoption).
Arguably, an aboriginal
right to self-government was also recognized and affirmed.
What, then, is the effect of section 35 on the rights recognized
and affirmed thereby?
Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act
provides that the Constitution "is the supreme law of Canada, and
any
law
that
is
inconsistent
with
the
provis~ons
of
the
Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force
or
effect."
Aboriginal
and
treaty
rights
are
thus
given
constitutional status, so that any federal or provincial law which
is inconsistent with them should be of no effect to that extent.
This is extremely important because in the past aboriginal and
treaty rights were subject to federal legislation, and aboriginal
hunting
rights,
at
least,
were
to
some
extent
subject
to
provincial legislation (treaty rights were generally shielded
against provincial legislation, because section 88 of the Indian
Act provided them with this protection).
There
is,
however,
a
catch
to
this
because
only
existing
aboriginal and treaty rights are recognized and affirmed by
section 35.
In an article I wrote shortly after the 1982 Act was
proclaimed ("The Constitutional Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples
of Canada", [1982] 4 Supreme Court L.R. 255), I argued that
"existing" means unextinguished.
Aboriginal or treaty rights that
had been completely abrogated prior to April 17, 1982, would not
be revived by the section.
However, rights that had been merely
restricted or limited by legislation, but not abrogated, would
s t i l l be in existence, and so would be caught by section 35.
The
legislation which restricted those rights would therefore be of no
force or effect to the extent that it was inconsistent with them.
The example I gave was the federal Migratory Birds Convention Act.
Although that Act has infringed both aboriginal and treaty rights,
prior to April 17, 1982, it was upheld by the Supreme Court as
valid legislation.
My argument was that the Migratory Birds
Convention Act merely restricted the hunting rights of aboriginal
peoples--it did not abrogate them.
Accordingly, those rights were
s t i l l in existence in 1982, although they could not be fully
exercised.
They
should
therefore
have
been
recognized
and
affirmed by section 35, making the Migratory Birds Convention Act
of no force or effect to the extent that it is inconsistent with
them.
[1988]
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To date,
reasoning.

however,

the

courts

have

not

adopted

this

line

of

In R. v. Eninew, [1984] 2 C.N.L.R. 122, Mr. Justice Gerein of the
Saskatchewan--COurt of Queen's Bench upheld the conviction of a
Treaty 10 Indian for hunting ducks out of season contrary to the
Migratory Birds Regulations.
The offence was committed on April
29, 1982, just twelve days after the 1982 Constitution Act came
into force.
Mr. Justice Gerein said the issue to be decided was
whether section 35 of the Act had the effect of invalidating the
Migratory Birds Regulations insofar as they apply to Indians,
restoring to them an unfettered right to hunt.
He began by
stating (at p.124) that the worcl "existing" relates to the entire
phrase "aboriginal and treaty rights", not just to the word
"aboriginal".
This is no doubt correct.
As to the effect of the
word "existing", he said (at p.124) that it limits the rights of
the aboriginal peoples "to those rights which were in being or
which were in actuality at the time when the Constitution Act came
into effect."
At that time, he continued (at p.125), "Indians did
not enjoy an unrestricted right to hunt •••• [T]his treaty right
had been abridged by a regulation of Parliament acting within its
authority.
The Constitution Act did not have the effect of
repealing the regulation or rendering it invalid.
Rather the
Constitution Act only recognized and secured the status quo."
This decision was upheld by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, but
without dealing with the effect of section 35.
(The Court of
Appeal held that the regulation in question did not violate the
accused's treaty rights, as the treaty provided for government
regulation of hunting rights.
This conclusion, however, is
inconsistent with the decision of the Northwest Territories Court
of Appeal in B:..!.. v. Sikyea (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 150, affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Canada, [1964] S.C.R. 642.)
In ~ v. Sutherland and Napash, [1984] 4 C.N.L.R. 133, the
distinction between rights that were abrogated and those that were
merely restricted was put directly to Ontario Provincial Court
Judge Cloutier with respect to two Treaty 9 Indians who had been
charged with possession of geese and ducks contrary to the
Migratory
Birds
Convention
Act.
Judge
Cloutier
apparently
accepted the distinction, and said an argument coulcl be made that
restricted rights s t i l l exist and are therefore retnstated by
virtue
of
section
35,
irrespective
of
the
Migratory
Birds
Convention Act.
However, he went on to hold that, on the basis of
authority (mainly the Sikyea case, supra), the Migratory~irds
Conve~tion Act did not merely restrict treaty rights--it abrogated
them in these circumstances.
This is a questionable conclusion,
in my view unsupported by the authorities Cloutier referred to,
which were not concerned with the distinction between restriction
and abrogation of rights.
Although it is true that the Act places
Indian s in the same position as other Can ad i ans insofar as the
[1988]
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hunting of most migratory birds is concerned, it does allow
Indians to take certain birds (~.&.!._ scoters, auks and guillemots)
for food or clothing, and so preserves their special right to hunt
to some extent.
In other words, their special right to hunt
migratory birds was not entirely taken away by the Act.
Moreover, the question which I think must be asked in these
circumstances is whether a right to hunt can be broken down into
separate rights to hunt different species or categories of game.
Is the right to hunt mallard ducks or Canada geese, or even
migratory birds generally, a right which can be isolated and
abrogated, while the right (or rights) to hunt other types of game
continues?
Or is there a general right to hunt which is merely
restricted by a prohibition on the hunting of certain species or
categories of game?
In my opinion, it is more in keeping with
general
principles
of
constitutional
interpretation
to
read
section 35(1) as referring to broad classes of rights, such as the
right to hunt or the right to fish, or even the right to hunt and
fish, rather than fragmenting the rights protected by that section
into narrow rights to take certain species or categories of game
or fish.
If this approach is adopted, then aboriginal and treaty
rights to hunt and fish could have been in existence on April 17,
1982, even though those rights were no longer exercisable on that
date where certain species or categories of game and fish were
concerned.
(See, however,~ v. Fle.!_!, [1987) 3 C.N.L.R. 70,
where Manitoba Provincial Court Judge Martin distinguished between
extinguishment and regulation, and concluded that the !!i.zratory
Birds Convention Act extinguished the right of treaty Indians to
hunt migratory birds because, in his mistaken view, i t placed
Indians on exactly the same footing as white recreational hunters.
Martin went on to hold that, due to section 35(1) of the 1982
Constitution Act, the Migratory Birds Convention Act is now of no
force or effect to the extent that it is inconsistent with that
right,
but
given
his
conclusion
that
the
right
had
been
extinguished prior to April 17, 1982, this is probably wrong.)
Another
federal
statute
that
has
been
challenged
as
being
inconsistent with aborigi~al and treaty rights and therefore
constitutionally invalid to that extent is the Fisheries Act.
Most of the recent cases dealing with the applicability of that
Act and the regulations made under it to aboriginal peoples have
held the word "existing" in section 35(1) of the 1982 Constitution
Act to mean that limitations on aboriginal and treaty rights to
fish that were already in place on April 17, 1982, continue to be
effective.
For example, in Steinhauer v. R., supra, Alberta Court of Queen's
Bench Judge Veit held that the accused did not have an existing
treaty right to fish without a licence because that right had been

[1988]
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Similarly, in R. v. Seward,
[1985] 4 C.N.L.R. 167, British
Columbia Provincial Court Judge Greer, in convicting six treaty
Indians of offences under the British Columbia Fishery (General)
~ulations, agreed (at pp.181-82) with the conclusion reached by
Mr.
Justice
Gerein
in
R.
v.
Eninew,
supra,
that
the
word
"existing" limits the rights of aboriginal peoples "to those
rights which were in being or which were in actuality at the time
when the Constitution Act, 1982 came into effect".
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In R. v. Hare and Debassi~, [1985] 3 C.N.L.R. 139, Mr. Justice
Thorson of the Ontario Court of Appeal, in applying the Ontario
Fishery Regulations to two treaty Indians, adopted (at p.155) the
interpretation of section 35(1) that Professor P.W. Hogg offered
in his Canada Act 1982 Annotated (1982) at p.83 that aboriginal
and treaty rights have been "' constitutionalized' prospectively,
so that past (validly enacted) alterations or extinguishments
continue to be legally effective, but future legislation which
purports to make any further alterations or extinguishments is of
no force or effect."
Thorson J.A.
went on to say that "whatever
right the respondents'
forefathers may once have enjoyed under
Treaty 94 in relation to fishing by means of gill nets had become
lost by operation of federal legislation well before these charges
were brought."
(Note that Thorson J.A. 's comments on the effect
o f s e c t i on 3 5 ( 1 ) we re p r o b a b 1 y o b i t ~ , b e c au s e he had p re v i o u s 1 y
said that the relevance of that section was not apparent to him,
as the offences had occurred in 1980.)
Professor Hogg's interpretation of section 35(1) was also accepted
in~
v. Nicholas and Bear,~~' by New Brunswick Provincial
Court Judge Desjardins, who added (at p.165) that section 35 "has
not changed ••• rights existing on the 17 April 1982, but has in
fact
'recognized'
and
'affirmed'
constitutionally
the
Indian
rights as they stood as affected by valid legislation and case law
on that particular date (i.e. a 'freeze')."
Finally, in~ v. Googoo, [1987] 2 C.N.L.R. 137, Nova Scotia
Provincial Court Judge O'Connell said (at p.141) that "[e]xisting
means unextinguished", and that any aboriginal or treaty right
which the accused Indian may have had to possess a fishing net had
been extinguished by the Nova Scotia Fishery Regulations before
April 17, 1982.
(Note that the regulation in question in Goo.&.Q_Q
had been amended in 1983, but O'Connell decided that did not
matter, as the new regulation was basically the same as the old
one, and so did not suppress any rights enjoyed by the accused on
April 17, 1982.)

[1988]
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These decisions, like the Migratory Birds Convention Act cases,
reveal a tendency on the part of the courts to regard aboriginal
and treaty rights as divisible into small parts.
A general right
to fish, it seems, is divisible into many narrower rights, such as
a right to fish without a licence, a right to fish with a gill
net, and even a right to possess a net.
Taking away any one of
these rights is an extinguishment of the narrow right, rather than
a restriction on the general right to fish.
One may wonder how
far this process of fragmentation of rights will go.
Is there a
separate right to take every single species of fish that may be
caught?
Are different sorts of nets each the subject of a
distinct right?
What about different net sizes?
There is another aspect of these section 35(1) decisions which is
equally troublesome.
If the effect of the section was to
constitutionalize aboriginal and treaty rights just as they stood
on April 17, 1982, that is, subject to any validly enacted
limitations in force at that time, this means that those rights
can be defined only b~
reference to the legislation which contains
...,,,J
those limitations.
In other words, ordinary statutes, and even
regulations made under delegated authority, must to some extent
determine the meaning of terms contained in the Constitution.
If
this is correct, the result is somewhat startling.
Under the
Fisheries Act, the federal government has made separate sets of
regulations for each province and territory in Canada, and in some
cases for individual species of fish as well.
Since these
regulations vary from one part of the country to the other, what
we
have
are
at
least
twelve
different
sets
of
delegated
legislation which must be consulted to find out the extent of the
aboriginal and treaty rights to fish which have been recognized
and affirmed by section 35(1).
Nor is this all.
If we look at
these regulations more closely, we will discover that they contain
precise provisions governing such matters as the species and
quantities of fish which can be lawfully taken, the types of nets
and other equipment which can be used, and even the size of the
holes in certain kinds of nets.
Though these minute provisions
have not been incorporated into the Constitution as such, they
must be consulted and applied like a template to the fishing
rights of the aboriginal peoples to determine where the limits of
those rights lie.
Moreover, unless the word "existing" is read as
meaning from time to time (which none of the decisions referred to
above suggested), the template which is to be applied is that
which existed on April 17, 1982.
Where fishing is concerned,
then, the aboriginal peoples' rights were "frozen" by these
different sets of detailed regulations, which may have been
amended since April 17, 1982, and which could be repealed, but
which would nonetheless continue to limit the extent of those
rights for the purpose of the Constitution.
If this is so, C~nada
must have one of the most bizarre constitutions in the world!

[1988] 1 C.N.L.R.
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This brings us to i£.~rrow v. The Queen, [1987] 1 C.N.L.R. 145,
which is probably the most important case decided so far on the
effect of section 35(1).
This case involved the application of
the Fisheries Act and the British Columbia Fishery (General)
Regulations to the Musqueam Indian band.
Under the regulations,
the band had been issued an Indian food fish licence each year,
starting in 1978, which authorized them to take salmon for food.
In 1983, the licence was amended to reduce the length of drift
nets which the Musqueams could use from 75 to 25 fathoms.
The
issue to be decided was whether this amendment was of any force or
effect, in view of section 35(1) of the 1982 Constitution Act.
Unlike the other cases we have looked at, Sparrow thus involved an
amendment affecting Indian fishing rights made after section 35(1)
came into force on April 17, 1982.

)

l
l

The British Columbia Court of Appeal, in a unanimous decision,
distinguished between extinguishment and regulation of Indian
fishing rights.
As a consequence of the enactment of section
35(1), an aboriginal right to fish for food can no longer be
extinguished by legislation.
However, it can still be regulated,
as long as the regulations give it priority over commercial and
sports fishing, and do not infringe on the aboriginal food fishery
in the sense of reducing the available catch below that required
for
reasonable
food
and
societal
(i.e.
ceremonial)
needs.
Moreover, regulations which "bear upon the exercise of the right
may nonetheless be valid, but only if they can be reasonably
justified
as
being
necessary
for
the
proper
management
and
conservation of the resource or in the public interest" (p.178).
Because there was not enough evidence to determine whether these
criteria had been met in this instance, the Court of Appeal
ordered a new trial.
What is especially significant about the Sparrow case is the
manner in which the Court of Appeal arrived at its conclusion that
section 35(1) did not entirely take away Parliament's power to
regulate aboriginal fishing rights.
The Court said that section
35(1) does not purport to revoke the power of Parliament under the
Constitution Act, section 91, subheadings (12) and (24), to make
laws in relation to sea coast and inland fisheries, and Indians
and lands reserved for the· Indians.
So "[t]he power to regulate
fisheries, including Indian access to the fisheries, continues,
subject
only
to
the
new
constitutional
guarantee
that
the
aboriginal rights existing on April 17, 1982 may not be taken
away" (p.177).
The aboriginal right of the Musqueams to fish for
food and ceremonial purposes has always been a regulated right
(originally, it had been regulated by the Musqueams themselves).
It continued to be. a regulated right on April 17, 1982.
It has
never been fixed, always taking its form from the circumstances in
which it has existed.
"If the interests of the Indians and other
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Canadians in the fishery are to be protected", the Court concluded
(at p.177), "then reasonable regulations to ensure the proper
management and conservation of the resource must be continued."
The Court of Appeal was thus able to avoid the absurdity of
concluding
that
the
75-fathom
net
length
in
the
Musqueam~'
pre-1983 licences was constitutionally protected.
It also avoided
the fragmentation of aboriginal rights which we noticed earlier.
The Court said (at p.178):
It is necessary to distinguish between a right
and the method by which the right may be
exercised.
The aboriginal right is not to
take fish by any particular method or by a net
of any particular length.
It is to take fish
for food purposes.
The breadth of the right
should be interpreted liberally in favour of
the Indians.
At the same time, however, the Court seriously limited the
protection
accorded
by
section
35(1).
Not
only
do
past
limitations on aboriginal rights continue to be effective, but
those limitations can even be extended, so long as this is done
for the purposes of management and conservation, and does not
extinguish
or
unreasonably
infringe
the
right
in
question.
Moreover, in the case of conflict between aboriginal rights and
conservation, conservation comes first.
What the Court of Appeal seems to have done in Sparrow is to read
a "reasonable limits" restriction into the rights protected by
section 35(1).
Whether or not this is de~irable on policy
grounds, there is nothing in the 1982 Constitution Act itself
which justifies this approach.
We have seen that section 35 is
located outside the Charter, and is therefore beyond the reach of
section 1.
The implication which should be drawn from this is
that the framers of the Act intended section 35 to stand on its
own, free from the limitations to which Charter rights are
subjected.
My own view of Sparrow is that it is a subversive decision.
If
the Court of Appeal's interpretation of section 35(1) is generally
adopted, then I think the protection which the section purports to
give to aboriginal and treaty rights will end up being largely
illusory, at least insofar as hunting and fishing rights are
concerned.
Our discussion has centred primarily on the effect of section
35(1) on federal legislative power.
Although we do not have time
to pursue the matter further today, it must nonetheless be
remembered that provincial legislative power is subject to the
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section as well.
In the prairie provinces, however, the Natural
Resources Transfer Agreements continue to apply.
In R. v. Horse,
[1984] 4 C.N.L.R. 99, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that,
with regard to provincial game laws, treaty hunting and fishing
rights were merged and consolidated by those agreements, which are
part of the Constitution of Canada.
The Court decided that
section 35(1) must be read subject to the agreements, and for this
reason it has no effect on the application of provincial game laws
to treaty Indians under the agreements.
An appeal of this
decision was heard by the Supreme Court of Canada on October 19,
1987, but a judgment has not yet been delivered.
Given the confused state of the present case law on section 35(1),
i t is too early to provide an adequate assessment of its impact.
The first Supreme Court decisions on this section are going to be
extremely important because they are going to set the tone and
create the precedential framework for future decisions.
It is
therefore essential that any cases taken to the Supreme Court as
test cases be supported by favourable factual circumstances and
superior legal argument.
At stake will be the rights not only of
those directly involved, but of all the ahorlginal people of
Canada, present and future.
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